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Do All Roads Lead to Rome?
Exploring the Underlying Logics of Similar Policies and Practices of Recruiting
Barbarian Soldiers in Roman and Early Chinese Empires
Pengfei Su
Pfsu1@hotmail.com
Introduction
There are many similarities between various aspects of the Roman and early Chinese
empires, which have been the focus of much academic discussion.1 A wide range of
comparative studies have been carried out and resulted in the publication of numerous
research papers. 2 Scholars have been using different approaches focusing upon
different areas to address this very broad comparative topic.3 Detailed analyses were
made to compare the two empires in respect to their coinage and monetary systems,4
state revenue and expenditures, 5 elite formation and social class advancement, 6 and
executive decision-making processes,7 just to mention a few. In a broader context, the
state formation processes of these two empires have been analyzed and compared in
light of their parallel movements.8

For an overview of academic publications in this aspect, see Walter Scheidel, The Stanford Ancient
Chinese and Mediterranean Empires Comparative History Project,
https://web.stanford.edu/~scheidel/acme.htm (last visited July 1, 2020, 9:00 pm).
2
For collections of the papers presented at such conferences, see e.g. Fritz-Heiner Mutschler and
Aachim Mittag (eds), Conceiving the Empire, Rome and China Compared (Oxford University Press,
2008); Walter Scheidel (eds), Rome and China, Comparative Perspectives on Ancient World Empires
(Oxford University Press, 2009).
3
See Johann Arnason, Introduction, in The Roman Empire In Context – Historical and Comparative
Perspectives (Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), at 14.
4
Walter Scheidel, Rome and China, Comparative Perspectives on Ancient World Empires (Oxford
University Press, 2009), at 137.
5
Walter Scheidel, State Power In Ancient China And Rome (Oxford University Press, 2015), at 150
6
Peter Fibiger Bang and Karen Turner, State Power In Ancient China And Rome (Walter Scheidel eds)
(Oxford University Press, 2015), at 11.
7
T. Corey Brennan, State Power In Ancient China And Rome (Walter Scheidel eds) (Oxford University
Press, 2015), at 39.
8
Christian Gizewski, Römische und alte chinesische Geschichte im Vergleich: Zur Möglichkeit eines
gemeinsamen Altertumsbegriffs, Klio 76: 271-302 (1994).
1
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Insightful research, for instance, has been done to compare these two empires with
respect to their military mobilization policies and to the relationships between their
military and civil leadership.9
Both of the demises of the classical empires on the two ends of the Eurasian continent
in the early first millennium AD were related to the fact that members of non-citizen or
non-subject barbarian10 tribes/polities performed military services in these empires and
then mutinied against them. From the previous centuries onwards, both Roman and
Chinese empires recruited into their armies tribal or frontier subjects or foreign subjects
who had recently migrated into the empires, and the performances of these soldiers were
consistently given positive comments by the host empires. During the late Roman
Empire, persons of barbarian origin were recruited into the Roman army in increasingly
larger numbers and played vital roles in guarding the imperial territories. Eventually it
was a group of Germanic military captains who terminated the regime of the Western
Roman Empire in 476 AD.
A similar process took place in China during the several centuries before the collapse
of the Jin (晋) Empire in north China in 317 AD. From the first century AD onwards,
the classical Chinese empire increasingly recruited into its army tribesmen of barbarian
origin, who played crucial roles in guarding the Chinese territories. This sort of
recruitment resumed on a more profound basis during the first decades of Jin Dynasty
(from 280 AD onwards). For example, Liu Yuan (刘渊), a Hun11 tribal leader, used to
be a military general and commanded Hun soldiers for a powerful Chinese prince before
he mutinied against the empire.12 A good understanding may be gained of the decline
and fall of these two classical empires by tracing the origins and developments of their
policies on recruiting barbarians, non-subjects or non-citizens into their armies.

See Nathan Rosenstein, War, State Formation, and the Evolution of Military Institutions in Ancient
China and Rome, in Rome and China, Comparative Perspectives on Ancient World Empires, at 24
(Oxford University Press, 2009).
10
Throughout this paper, the term “barbarian” only means belonging to a community that was not
directly ruled by one of the classical civilizations (e.g. Roman Republic or Empire, or ancient Chinese
empires), but the term does not in any sense carry any meaning of being inferior, uncivilized, backward
or violent. Modern scholarship has convincingly proved that many such reputedly “barbarian” peoples
created brilliant achievements in institutional, cultural, technological and other aspects. The uses of the
term “barbarian” in this paper are only for purpose of convenient reference to various ancient peoples
who were so referred to in ancient texts.
11
Also spelled as “Xiongnu” (匈奴).
12
Liu Yuan’s early career as a Chinese military officer was in parallel to various invading Germanic
tribal leaders who once served as Roman military officers.
9

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol84/iss84/5

2

Su: Do All Roads Lead to Rome? Exploring the Underlying Logics of Sim

Comparative Civilizations Review

7

Before we examine why an ancient empire’s policy on recruiting soldiers from tribal
subjects underwent fundamental changes, we need to first understand its military
recruitment rules in general, because an ancient empire’s practice in recruiting
barbarians or tribal subjects closely followed its overall rationale regarding enlisting
soldiers from the society at large.
This paper is organized in the following structure:
Part I argues that a seven-phase evolutionary trajectory of ancient Rome and early
Chinese empire in military recruitment policy bore strong resemblances to each other.
An analysis of such seven-phase policy transformations indicates that the two empires
at their early stages were similar to each other in recruiting mainly from their
geographical central regions and their political core elements. The emergence of a
professional standing army would naturally come as the next stage for both states.
However, the mass conscription system existed for a longer period in China than in
Rome due to fierce competitions among the Sinic states during the Warring States
period. After universal empires were established in Rome and China, they both resorted
to massive recruitment of barbarian tribal soldiers to maintain their military strength.
Although soldiers from various tribal groups were enlisted into the troops of the early
Chinese empire to defend its many thousands of miles of northern borderline facing the
Eurasian steppe,13 tribal soldiers were recruited not only from the nomadic communities
on its northern border but also from the sub-tropical regions in the south.
Part II will discuss the military service obligations required by the early Chinese
empires of some indigenous tribes living in the middle range of the Yangtze River
Valley. The special legal treatment (including exemptions) these barbarian tribes
received from the early Chinese states regarding military service obligations will be
investigated in the first case study of Part II.
The second case study in Part II concerns an early Han dynasty death penalty appellate
case in which the pre-existing exemption was surprisingly disregarded against a
barbarian adult male who had dodged military service, and the case epitomizes a
turning-point in the early Chinese empire’s policy on its military recruitment of
barbarians.

For example, in the 2nd century, soldiers recruited from Wuhuan (乌桓) and Xianbei (鲜卑) tribes
were defending the Han Empire’s northeastern frontier, soldiers from tribes of southern Huns were
defending its due north frontier, while soldiers from Qiang (羌) tribes were defending its northwestern
territories.
13
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The third case study describes resistance incidents launched by Banshun tribesmen in
the second century against excessive corvee and military service obligations, although
they had previously played an indispensable role in supporting the Han Empire’s
military actions. Two comparable resistance events in contemporary Roman Empire
were described: Bellum Batonianum and the Revolt of the Batavi.
Part III summarizes a series of common patterns in the evolution of the two empires’
policies on recruiting tribal subjects. For example, the standing of both empires’
military recruits gradually changed from the society’s politically-franchised classes to
its powerless domestic subjects, and then onto its politically-remote frontier subjects;
the geographical origins of the military recruits gradually changed from the national’s
central regions to its peripherals. Part III explores broader implications of the two
empires’ parallel transformations in military recruitment policies, and it is posited that
the deeper mechanism of convergent evolution was at work in driving such similar
policy transformations in both empires. When the trajectories of the evolutions of
various circumstantial social factors were similar in these two classical empires, it
naturally followed that their rules and practices on military recruitment would evolve
in the same directions.
Part I: Similar Evolutionary Phases in Military Recruitment Policies
Generally speaking, the Roman policy on recruitment of soldiers underwent the
following stages of transitions, and each of such stages is coded in chronological order
from R(1) to R(7):
Stage
R1
R2
R3
R4
R5
R6
R7

Military Recruitment Policy in Rome
A citizen militia, meeting applicable property qualifications.
In the later periods of R(1), military recruitment expanded to include able-bodied
men from annexed territories in Italy, plus occasional levy of a universally
conscripted mass army.
A nascent professional standing army, with no need for meeting property
qualifications
A professional standing army, divided into units of legions and auxiliaries:
legionaries were recruited mainly from Roman citizens in Italy, and auxiliary
soldiers were recruited primarily from non-citizens in the provinces.
Increasingly, legionaries were recruited from non-Italian citizens and non-citizens.
The overwhelming majority of Roman soldiers were recruited from non-citizen
provincials and sometimes from barbarians.
A substantial proportion of Roman soldiers were recruited from external
barbarians who had recently migrated into Roman territories. Then came the end
of the Western Roman Empire.

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol84/iss84/5
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In the above transformative processes that played out during a period of approximately
one millennium (i.e. from Servius Tullius’ reign in the mid-sixth century BC until the
demise of the Western Roman Empire in 476 AD), we may observe a trend in which
the main sources of Roman military recruits moved step by step (i) from Rome’s
political power center to its powerless peripherals and (ii) from Rome’s geographical
center to its territorial peripherals.
The above seven-phase model should be distinguished from the nine-phase model
posited by Christian Gizewski in his paper published in 1994.14 First, while Gizewski’s
paper discusses the broad theme of state formation in general, this paper addresses the
specific topic of military recruitment policy, especially the application of such rules to
barbarian tribesmen. Second, territorial annexation/fragmentation is an overarching
topic in Gizewski’s paper, while this paper focuses on the analysis of policies that
evolved in disregard of territorial status.
Third, in Gizewski’s model, the statuses of Chinese and Roman states evolved in a close
parallel in time, while this paper shows there was a longer time difference between each
step of their policy transformations.
Similarly, during the early Chinese civilization from the Spring & Autumn period to
Han Dynasties, military recruitment underwent the following stages of transitions, with
each of such stages being coded in chronological order from C(1) to C(7) :
Stage

C1
C2
C3
C4
C5
C6
C7

Military Recruitment Policy in Early China

An aristocratic militia, meeting hereditary ranking qualifications.
In the later periods of C(1), military recruitment expanded to include commoners
in the vast rural territories, with no need for meeting hereditary ranking
qualification.
A nascent professional army, whose soldiers were recruited from the society at
large on selective criteria.
Universally conscripted mass army.
The army of the empire was comprised of both conscripted subjects and
professional soldiers.
The army of the empire was comprised mainly of professional soldiers, many of
whom came from low-class provincial backgrounds or frontier barbarian tribes.
A substantial number of the Chinese empire’s soldiers were recruited from
external barbarians who recently migrated into the territories of the empire. Then
came the end of the classical Chinese empire in northern China.

See Christian Gizewski, “Römische und alte chinesische Geschichte im Vergleich: Zur Möglichkeit
eines gemeinsamen Altertumsbegriffs’, Klio 76: 287 - 288 (1994).
14
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In the above evolutionary processes that lasted nearly one millennium (770 BC – 317
AD), we can observe a trend in which the main sources of military recruits in early
China moved step by step (i) from the Sinic states’ political power center to their
powerless peripherals and (ii) from a Sinic state’s geographical center to its territorial
peripherals. The basic patterns in the transformation of military recruitment policies in
early Chinese states were quite similar to the journey of contemporary Rome. The only
key difference seemed to be that early Chinese states each maintained a universallyconscripted mass army (at least in theory) for several centuries while the levy of a
universally-conscripted mass army was an ephemeral phenomenon in Rome.
In below sub-sections I.A – I.H of Part I, we will compare each of the seven similar
transformational phases that occurred in Rome and early China. I propose that there
was always a time difference of two to three centuries between each step of the policy
transformations in the two empires. We will see that their transformations were often
(although not always) prompted by similar social trends and followed similar logic:
I. A: Comparing Rome’s stage R(1) with China’s stage C(1)
After the military reform of Servius Tullius, the army of early Rome was largely a
citizen militia, which was assembled from Roman citizens who had met certain property
ownership standards and would be disbanded at the end of each war. The Roman
Republic periodically held censuses that registered the property ownership status of
their citizens and divided them into six different classes, and members of each of the
first five classes were required to serve different military roles with different
armaments.15 Roman citizens who did not meet minimum property qualifications (i.e.
proletarii) were not allowed to join the Roman army, while the other classes of citizens
were eligible for military service.16 Eligibility for military services enabled Roman
citizens to vote (with different weights) in the Roman legislative assembly comitia
centuriata, which decided on issues of war and peace, enacted legislation, elected
consuls and praetors, and considered capital punishment appeals.
Young Roman aristocrats with public service aspirations had to complete at least ten
years of military services before becoming eligible for public offices.17 Most politicians
of the Roman Republic (including famous orators such as Cicero) had many years of
military service or command experiences. In short, it was the active voters and political
participants of the early Roman Republic that were serving in the Roman army and
fighting its wars, and it was the members of its innermost circle of political elite who
were physically commanding the same army in the battlefield.

Livy 1.42.5 – 43.10.
For the applicable minimum property qualifications, see Pierre Cagniart, The Late Republican Army
(146 – 30 BC), in A Companion to the Roman Army (Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2007), at 81.
17
Polybius, 6.19.5.
15
16
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The armies of Western Zhou dynasty and the early Spring & Autumn Sinic states were
largely aristocratic militias, which were assembled primarily from the male members
of the ruling ethnic groups in a polity (such members were called “国人” or “guoren”,
meaning “countrymen”), who had been accorded certain official ranks in that polity’s
political hierarchical system. Except for direct retinues of the aristocrats, local
commoners (who were mostly of different ancestral origins from the ruling groups) did
not join the army or participate in any military campaign.
The “countrymen” who were eligible for military services were supposed to be
consulted by the body politic at countrymen’s assemblies on issues of national
emergency, relocation of state capital, appointment of new rulers, and significant
judicial cases.18 In the standard curriculum for the education that should be received
by young aristocratic males, skills in military formations, archery and chariot-driving,
which were crucial for military actions of that era, were taught as compulsory courses.19
Most aristocrats who were active during the Spring & Autumn period seemed to have
some military service or command experiences. In short, at this stage it was the direct
participants in a Sinic polity’s political life who were serving in the army of that polity
and fighting its wars, and it was the members of its innermost circle of political elite
who were physically commanding the same army in the battlefield.
I. B: Comparing Rome’s stage R(2) with China’s stage C(2)
During the later periods of R(1), after Rome defeated and conquered adjacent polities
in central and southern Italy, Rome expanded the scope of its military recruitment to
able-bodied men from the newly-acquired alliance territories (socii), and soldiers from
such alliance territories formed their own independent units (alae) while fighting battles
on the Roman side.20
As a result of the integration with its annexed territories, the Roman Republic kept a
huge reservoir of military manpower which none of the neighboring polities could
compete against. For example, in 225 BC, based upon the figures provided by Polybius,
it was estimated that Rome had a maximum military reserve of 900,000 men, of whom
more than a third were Romans (325,000) and the rest were men from the consolidated
Roman socii in Italy.21

18

Zhouli, Qiuguan Sikou Fifth (《周礼·秋官司寇第五》), Beijing Normal University Publishing House (

北京师范大学出版社) 2019, at p.293.
19

Zhouli, Diguan Situ Second (《周礼·地官司徒第二》), Beijing Normal University Publishing House (

北京师范大学出版社) 2019, at p.118.
20
Michael Sage, The Republican Roman Army – A Sourcebook (Routledge, 2008), at 127.
21
Klaus Bringmann, A History of the Roman Republic, at 34.
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Major Sinic states had previously acquired many territorial areas around their capital
cities either during the early Zhou period (after the establishment of these states) or
during the early Spring & Autumn period, without systematically recruiting military
personnel from such annexed territories. From the mid-seventh century BC onwards,
however, some of these states (e.g. states of Qi (齐), Chu (楚) and Jin (晋)) began to
expand the scope of their military recruitments to men living in such acquired territories
and rural hinterlands.
As a result of their integration with the annexed territories, some Sinic polities began to
have a huge reservoir of military resources and manpower whose order of magnitude
had been unthinkable during a previous era. For example, in 530 BC, the king of the
state of Chu claimed that from each of the 4 smaller polities that Chu had acquired in
the Central Plains region, he could levy 1,000 chariots.22 Given that the state of Chu
acquired a total of approximately 48 lesser states during this period, the scale of its
expansion of military resources was huge.
The above expansions were the very first step in a long journey of transformation, in
which the main sources of military recruitments in Rome and early Sinic states
gradually shifted away from their capital cities and geographical centers and moved
step by step onto the relatively peripheral regions.
I. C: Comparing Rome’s stage R(3) with China’s stage C(3)
By the late second century BC, it became difficult for the Roman Republic to recruit
soldiers from its wealthier propertied citizens, whose enthusiasm in military services
had begun to decline. In 107 BC, Gaius Marius reformed the military recruitment
system by abolishing the property qualification so that lower-class plebian and
proletarians became eligible for enlistment,23 and ad-hoc service in the Roman army
was replaced with 16 years of continuous service. His reform effectively improved the
quantity and quality of Roman military personnel and paved the road for a series of
Roman military triumphs in the next stage. In particular, his reform initiated the
formation of a professional standing army which engaged in rigorous systematic
training and drilling all the year round even in times of peace.
His soldiers should be able to march long distances in a day, and in marches they were
required to personally carry various heavy weapons, tools, supplies and provisions for
many days’ needs.24 They won the nickname of “Marius’ mules” (muli mariani) due
to their reputation for strong physique and stamina.
Zuozhuan, Duke of Zhao 12th Year; James Legge, The Chinese Classics, vol. 5, p. 641.
Sallust, The War Against Jugurtha 86.1-4.
24
Pierre Cagniart, The Late Republican Army (146 – 30 BC), in A Companion to the Roman Army
(Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2007), at 87.
22
23
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The early Warring States period witnessed a similar transformation that occurred in
China towards the establishment of a professional army whose soldiers were selected
from the society at large on strict criteria.
During this period, the state of Qi selected and recruited men who possessed impressive
martial arts and soldiers so recruited were rewarded with handsome pay. When
enlisting its elite infantry soldiers, the state of Wei required that an applicant should be
able to exercise while wearing helmet and three layers of armor and draw a bow with a
force of 360 kilograms; he was required to be able to march as long as 40 kilometers
within a period of daybreak till midday while carrying a halberd (i.e. an axe combined
into a spear), a sword on the waist, 50 arrows with a quiver on the back, and food that
could provide for three days’ needs. 25 It seemed as if the state of Wei was
unconsciously selecting infantry soldiers on criteria that were similar to those for
“Marius’ mules”. Besides, both Marius and the state of Wei endowed land estates to
their soldiers who had passed such strict recruitment tests and fulfilled the service
tenure.26
At this stage both Roman and Chinese states took a crucial step towards instituting
military systems that were based on professional standing armies. In both Rome and
China, the sources for recruiting soldiers were moving further towards the entire
domestic population, regardless of wealth, political power or hereditary status.
I. D: Comparing Rome’s Universal Conscription with China’s stage C(4)
Despite the same type of development as described in above sub-section C, the
evolutionary paths of Roman and early Chinese recruitment then temporarily parted
ways, in that the latter soon adopted a universal conscription system while Rome
resorted to it only on a very occasional basis.
Only in time of military crises did Rome conduct general levies of able-bodied male
citizens (sometimes even slaves) on a compulsory basis.
For example, the Roman Republic launched compulsory levies of soldiers in 193 BC
(for a campaign against Ligurian mountaineers) and in 171 BC (against an offensive
from the kingdom of Macedon).27 In the Pannonian Revolt that lasted between 6 AD
and 9 AD, Augustus not only launched a general levy of free citizens but also ordered
emancipation and compulsory conscription of thousands of slaves in order to raise an
army. However, such instances of general levies never became the norm in Rome.
Xunzi, Eric L. Hutton trans., at 149 (Princeton University Press, 2014).
See ibid. See also supra note 20, at 241.
27
Dexter Hoyos, The Age of Overseas Expansion (264 – 146 BC), in A Companion to the Roman Army
(Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2007), at 63 – 64.
25
26
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In contrast, during the mid and late Warring States period when the seven Sinic states
engaged in total warfare against each other, they resorted to universal levies of their
able-bodied males to build mass armies. According to the remarks of the famous
diplomat Su Qin (苏秦), during this period, from its capital region of the state of Qi
200,000 soldiers could be levied; the states of Zhao, Han and Yan could each enlist
several hundred thousand soldiers; the state of Wei kept 200,000 regular soldiers and
300,000 auxiliary soldiers; the states of Chu and Qin each maintained an army of about
1 million men.28 Each state was able to maintain such huge numbers of soldiers only if
it made military service a universal obligation for its able-bodied men. For example, in
the crucial war between the states of Qin and Zhao in the Changping (长平) region in
260 BC, the king of Qin ordered that all males aged above 15 in the region near the
battlefield should be conscripted into Qin’s army, so that the opponent army of about
400,000 soldiers could be thoroughly encircled.29 As another example, when the state
of Qin launched a decisive war against the state of Chu in 224 BC, Qin’s commanding
general made it an imperative requirement that troops of 600,000 men must be
mobilized before any attack was launched.30
The above difference between Rome and China in relation to universal conscription
arose from the fact that except for a few isolated wars such as Hannibal’s invasion of
Italy during the Second Punic War, Rome of this era seldom needed to engage in any
life-and-death fights with its enemies. After the Roman Republic consolidated its rule
over central and southern Italy, it was separated from most of its military opponents by
the Mediterranean and other forms of natural barriers. Based upon its sufficient
recruitment of citizen soldiers and wise alignment of alliance forces, the Roman
Republic maintained a huge reserve of manpower available for military services.
Most of Rome’s neighboring polities lacked any equally systematic mobilization
mechanism, and the post-Alexander Hellenistic states frequently relied upon costly
services of mercenaries whose number could never afford to be massive. In contrast,
due to the peculiar geographical circumstances of China’s central heartland (especially
the extreme compactness of the layout of the early Sinic states), the polities of the
Warring States were in constant fierce geopolitical competition with their neighboring
polities, and the wars of elimination among them worked in a very crude form of
“survival of the fittest”. Each polity of the Warring States always had to fight endlessly
for its very survival, and many of their peer polities who had failed to mobilize for total
wars had been annihilated.
28

Sima Qian (司马迁), Records of the Historian, Vol. 69, Biography of Su Qin (《史记卷六十九•苏秦

列传》), Zhonghua Publishing House(中华书局) 2006, at p.423 – 427.
29

Sima Qian (司马迁), Records of the Historian, Vol. 73, Biography of Bai Qi and Wang Jian (《史记

卷七十三•白起王翦列传》), Zhonghua Publishing House (中华书局) 2006, at p.453.
30
Ibid at 452.
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Despite the prevalence of universal conscription in China during this period, we should
deem it as a deviation from the inevitable evolutionary path towards the establishment
of a professional standing army. Once the fierce competition for the Holy Grail of
national unification began to subside, the nation would feel a strong push for reverting
to the regular path of military professionalization.
I. E: Comparing Rome’s stage R(4) with China’s Transition from stage C(4) to C(5)
Rome’s stage R(4) came naturally as part of Augustus’ political settlement for the
Roman army at the end of the Roman civil war. After defeating Marcus Antonius at
the Battle of Actium and conquering Egypt, Augustus wanted to prevent rampant wars
from erupting again and to demand allegiance from his soldiers. Rome was not facing
any strong enemy on its borders, and it was relatively easy for Augustus to demobilize
his massive army by allocating land or granting cash to the soldiers. 31 He
professionalized and standardized the Roman army within a matter of several years
without meeting strong resistance.
In contrast, professional standing armies emerged in China fairly early but took a very
long time to become the prevalent system. This transformation took several centuries
to complete, and was interrupted in the middle by a universal conscription system that
was in active practice for about two centuries. A profound divergence appeared here
between the evolutionary paths taken by the early Roman and Sinic states: the Roman
state first expanded and consolidated its territories before it evolved into an absolutist
Principate, while multiple Sinic states first turned absolutist before they eventually
consolidated into a unified empire. Early consolidation of vast territories meant that
once civil wars were over, Rome did not have to maintain a universally-conscripted
mass army to fight for its own survival and a professional army became the logical
choice for Roman military institutions.
Early transformation into absolutist states in China meant that each state had the
administrative power to levy a huge number of soldiers and to mobilize enormous
resources for fighting heated total wars against each other. As the consolidation of the
early Sinic states took place relatively late, the task of building a professional standing
army was delayed in China again and again: late Warring states kingdoms would not
consider this choice, considering the tremendous military pressures they faced from
their peer states; the short-lived Qin empire actively pursued military campaigns on its
northern borders against the Huns and marched into the Pearl River Delta to conquer
vast areas of territories in southern China; and an enormous amount of manpower was
mobilized by the Qin regime into its military system. After the death of Qin emperor
Shihuangdi, fierce uprisings broke out against the Qin regime all over the country,
which was followed by seven years of civil wars.
31

See supra note 20, at 249.
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Even after the Han Empire was established, there existed a high level of tension between
the imperial central government and the vassal states in the eastern half of the empire.
In the civil war of 154 BC between the imperial government and certain vassal states,
the rebelling king of the state of Wu ordered the conscription of all males in his state
aged between 14 (which was the age of his junior son) and 62 (which was the age of
the king himself) and mobilized an army of over 300,000 men.32 The quick defeat of
the rebellion army within three months at the hand of the smaller number of troops of
the central government signified the end of the age of fully-mobilized total wars in
classical China.
After domestic territorial consolidation ceased to pose a major threat to the imperial
central government, the military recruitment system in China started to converge upon
the same trajectory as that of Rome, and some other channels began to play significant
roles in military recruitment. Although during much of the Western Han Dynasty the
government maintained the universal conscription system, the long pent-up pressure for
recruiting soldiers on a professional basis soon started to assert itself, and from emperor
Wudi (武帝) onwards the empire heavily utilized troops that were recruited from
volunteers. At this stage, the soldiers utilized by the Chinese empire in its military
campaigns came from the following channels:
(1) Universal conscription
This system was a remnant from the previous total war era, and was kept alive in
theory throughout the Western Han Dynasty (202 BC – 8 AD). The general trend
during this period, however, was that the proportion of conscripted soldiers declined
over time, while volunteers and tribal soldiers became increasingly important
sources of military recruitment. Compared with the subjects of the Qin state of the
late Warring States era, common peasants of the Han Empire showed much less
enthusiasm for participation in military services. Able-bodied commoners who
were subject to military service obligations were able to be exempted from a draft
after paying a special tribute called “gengfu” (更赋), whose revenues could help the
imperial government pay for the services of soldiers who were recruited from other
sources.
During much of the golden age of the Roman Empire, military service was voluntary
and was generally regarded as an attractive career that provided commoners with
prospects for social mobility. During the late empire, however, military service
seemed to become much less popular and the empire had to issue legislations to
enforce conscription.

Sima Qian, Records of the Historian, Biography of Liu Bi King of Wu, Yang Hsien-yi & Gladys
Yang trans., at p. 300 (The Commercial Press Limited, Hong Kong 1975).
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The same practice of tribute payment in lieu of service also was adopted in Rome,
albeit at a much later time: after Ostrogoth tribes crossed the Danube in 376 AD
into Roman territory and provided ample sources for military services, it became
possible for able-bodied men who would otherwise be drafted into the Roman army
to avoid such drafts after making a cash payment (adaeratio) to the Roman
government.33
(2) Volunteer elite guards
Into the elite troops (called the Northern Army and the Southern Army) that
guarded the Han Empire’s capital region, emperor Wudi recruited able-bodied
men from farmer families living in the six frontier prefectures to the north and west
of the imperial capital region, whose residents had traditionally been known for
their valor and hunting skills. These recruits served in the capital region as
professional soldiers in imperial guard sections called Yulin (羽林) and Qimen
(期门) and, after leaving military services, were able to take important posts in the
government. Some of them could be expected to have career paths that were
somewhat comparable to those of Praetorian Guards of the Roman Empire.
(3) Volunteer convicts and vagabonds
Among the 25 wars the Western Han emperor launched against the Huns, in at least
six wars the Han soldiers were primarily recruited from convicts and volunteers
who had been vagabonds or jobless young villains.34
(4) Recruits from domestic tribes
Prior to the issuance of Caracalla’s Edict in 212 AD, soldiers of the Roman legions
were recruited from Roman citizens, while soldiers of its auxiliary troops were
normally non-citizens (with auxiliary troops often being identified by their tribal or
provincial origins) and their soldiers gained citizenship only at the end of their 25
years of service.
In contrast, the early Chinese empire did not create any specific legal terminology
to distinguish between (i) its troops whose soldiers were recruited from the subjects
under the empire’s household registration system and (ii) the troops who were
recruited from tribal entities outside the household registration system.

Gabriela Wesch-Klein, Recruits and Veterans, in A Companion to the Roman Army (Blackwell
Publishing Ltd, 2007), at 437.
34
Lei Haizong (雷海宗)，Zhongguo Wenhua Yu Zhongguo de Bing (中国文化与中国的兵)（Yuelu
Publishing House, 2010, at 38 – 39.
33
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Meanwhile, tribe-based troops often fought as separate units and frequently won
accolades from the imperial government due to their bravery and military
achievements.

(5) Barbarians that migrated into the territories of Han Empire
Inclusion of external barbarian soldiers showed that the sources of the Han Empire’s
military recruitment were moving further away from its political center and deeper
into its geographical peripherals.
With the passage of time, channel (1) would disappear, channel (2) would remain but
play a less significant role, channel (3) would flourish for some time, the next to flourish
would be channel (4), which would be followed by channel (5).
I. F: Comparing Rome’s stage R(5) with China’s stage C(5)
Around its foundation, the legionaries of the Roman Empire came primarily from Italian
rural background. After that, the legions increasingly recruited from non-Italian
citizens of the provinces. It is estimated that during the reign of Augustus, 68% of
legionaries were of Italian origin; by the middle of the first century AD, 48% of
legionaries were of Italian origin, and by the end of the first century AD, this proportion
had fallen to 22%; in the second century AD, only 2% of citizen soldiers were of Italian
origin.35
In parallel, when the Han Empire loosened the system of universal conscription from
subjects living in Chinese heartland under the household registration system, it began
to recruit soldiers from tribes living in remote peripheral regions of the empire.
For example, into the Southern Army that guarded the imperial capital region, emperor
Wudi instituted eight different sections, three of which were staffed by soldiers who
had been recruited from indigenous Yue (越) tribes from southern China and Hun
horsemen that had defected to the empire, i.e. the Yue Calvary Commandant
(越骑校尉), Changshui Commandant (长水校尉) and Hunnish Cavalry Commandant
(胡骑校尉). Soldiers in these three sections were part of the major elite troops that
closely guarded the imperial central government. The role these tribal soldiers played
was comparable to those of the Roman guard units Custodes Germanica, which were
recruited from Germanic tribes living on Roman frontier territories and participated in
the guarding of the emperors of the Julio-Claudian dynasty.36

Keith Hopkins, The Political Economy of Roman Empire, in The Dynamics of Ancient Empires
(Oxford University Press, 2009), at 194.
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Suetonius, Vita Divus Augustus, ch.49.
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I. G: Comparing Rome’s stage R(6) with China’s stage C(6)
In both empires of this stage, young men of elite political backgrounds seldom regarded
military service as an attractive path for upward mobility, and military services
increasingly became the tasks of social groups that were socially unprivileged and
geographically peripheral.
In the second century, Roman citizens of Italian origin, who had been the traditional
source for recruitment of Roman legionaries, increasingly refrained from serving in the
Roman legions, and the Roman Empire had to recruit more and more soldiers from
Roman citizens living in the provinces and from non-citizen residents (peregrini) in the
vast territories of the empire. For many non-citizen soldiers, obtaining Roman
citizenship upon retirement from military service (together with receiving a large
amount of retirement payment) was one of their key incentives for joining the Roman
army.
For example, due to the rampant epidemic that dealt a heavy blow to some of the Roman
territories during the reign of emperor Marcus Aurelius, Rome suffered a tremendous
loss of population, as a result of which Marcus Aurelius had to recruit into the Roman
army not only emancipated slaves but also Germanic tribesmen who had settled in
Roman territory.37
After Caracalla’s Decree in 212 AD abolished the legal distinction between Rome’s
citizens and non-citizens, Rome recruited its soldiers without regard to citizen status,
so long as a recruited man was a free-born non-slave. By this stage, Italians seldom
served in the Roman army, which recruited primarily from low-class provincials.
A similar process slowly unfolded also in the Chinese empire. The Eastern Han
Dynasty (founded in 25 AD) abolished the outdated universal conscription system and
recruited professional soldiers mainly from low-class provincials and remote
indigenous tribes. In 30 AD, various categories of local armies that were previously
required to be maintained during the Western Han Dynasty were demobilized. Around
110 AD, the imperial government abolished the longstanding practice of an annual
military inspection ceremony presided over by the emperor.38 The prevalent opinion
among the literati officials during this period was that the empire should exalt civic
virtues and restrain military endeavors. Under normal circumstances, the central
government of the Eastern Han Dynasty kept a professional army whose size was
drastically smaller than those of the previous dynasty.
Karl Strobel, Strategy and Army Structure between Septimius Severus and Constantine the Great, in
A Companion to the Roman Army (Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2007), at p. 278.
38
Fan Ye (范晔), Houhanshu, Vol. 60, Biography of Ma Rong (《后汉书卷六十•马融传》), Zhonghua
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Typical recruits during this period were vagabonds from urban tradesman families, the
procedures for selecting recruits were normally lax, and many soldiers so recruited did
not receive adequate training.
Slots for military service positions were often filled by auction and sale to the highest
bidders.39 When the imperial treasury met with fiscal difficulty due to incessant natural
disasters and epidemics throughout the country, military expenses and provisions for
the central armies had to be cut down accordingly, which further aggravated the decline
in the quality of the imperial military system. For example, in the fall of 162 AD, the
government announced that only half of the regular pay would be made to the many
soldiers in the once-elite central armies who had then become too weak to participate
in combat and that such soldiers would be denied the provision of winter-time
uniforms.40
Given the mounting fiscal pressure and the deteriorating quality of soldiers recruited
from within the household registration system, it followed naturally that the East Han
Empire resorted to massively recruiting soldiers from frontier barbarians that had
migrated and settled in the empire’s territory. Such recruitment would not only
substantially lessen the fiscal burden of the government and but also enlist soldiers who
possessed horsemanship and fighting skills that were not easily available from recruits
from Chinese heartlands.
For example, in the military campaign the Han government launched against the
northern Huns in 73 AD, the imperial expedition army included 22,000 cavalry soldiers
from Qiang tribes, nearly 10,000 soldiers from Southern Hun tribes, and 11,000 cavalry
soldiers from the tribes of nomadic Wuhuan and Xianbei peoples.41 In the empire’s
decisive military victory over northern Huns in 89 AD, the troops that played crucial
roles were about 30,000 cavalry soldiers from Southern Hun tribes and 8,000 cavalry
soldiers from Qiang tribes.42
Closely associated with such heavy reliance upon barbarian soldiers was the Eastern
Han Empire’s serious deficiency in domestic defense and its inability to recruit enough
capable soldiers from its own heartland.

39

Fan Ye (范晔), Houhanshu, Vol. 7, Annals of Emperor Xiao Huan (《后汉书卷七•孝桓帝纪》),

Zhonghua Publishing House(中华书局) 1999, at p.204.
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For example, when the Qiang tribes rebelled against the empire on many occasions in
the second century, the empire was totally incapable of staging effective defenses, and
its local governors would promptly escape from their fortresses soon after meeting any
military defeat. The Qiang tribes’ invasion army penetrated deeply into the western
frontiers of the empire and committed much pillaging.
This exposed the inherent weakness of the East Han Empire’s military system and could
be regarded as an omen of the barbarian conquest of northern China that would unfold
nearly two centuries later.
I. H: Comparing Rome’s stage R(7) with China’s stage C(7)
At this last phase, a substantial portion of the soldiers in both empires were recruited
from barbarians who had recently migrated into that empire’s territories, and both
empires seemed to have largely “outsourced” their defense tasks to outsiders.
After Caracalla’s Decree declared all free-born subjects in the Roman territory as
Roman citizens, a key incentive for non-citizen Romans to join the Roman army (i.e.,
winning Roman citizenship) was lost. The Late Roman Empire experienced serious
difficulty in recruiting soldiers from its normal citizens. Numerous legal rules enacted
during this period showed that Roman citizens resorted to various methods (even selfmutilation) to escape military service. 43 The empire had to adopt novel methods to
meet the shortage of military recruits.
From the third century onwards, barbarian troops keeping their pre-existing tribal
organizations (called “foederati”) were widely incorporated into the Roman army and
largely took over the roles previously played by the Roman auxilia. For example,
Caracalla formed cavalry troops composed of Scythians and German tribesmen; he
added forces of Germanic people from north of Danube (including Gothic tribesmen)
to his field army on the Danube and brought them to Asia for campaigns with Parthians;
Valerian brought Germanic forces to Asia in 258 AD; and in the Germanic campaigns
of Severus Alexander, Parthian mercenaries fought for Rome as heavy armor
horsemen.44 After the Roman army became deeply barbarized, contemporary Roman
authors sometimes used the terms barbarus (barbarian) and miles (soldier) as
synonymous.45

See Michael Whitby, Army and Society in the Late Roman World: A Context for Decline, in A
Companion to the Roman Army (Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2007), at 518; see also Gabriela WeschKlein, Recruits and Veterans, in A Companion to the Roman Army (Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2007), at
437.
44
See supra note 37, at 279.
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After barbarian soldiers began to revolt against the Roman Empire in the late fourth
century, Roman legions had a hard time suppressing such rebellions. After the Roman
Empire suffered from a disastrous defeat at the battle of Adrianople, in 382 AD the
Roman Empire and the Visigoths entered into a treaty under which the Visigoths were
allowed to migrate and settle in Roman territories as an autonomous community while
they became obligated to serve in the Roman army in times of war.46 However, soon
after the death in 395 AD of emperor Theodosius I who had negotiated the treaty, the
same Visigoth tribes rebelled, and the only Roman general who could stage effective
defense was Flavius Stilico, who was of half Vandal blood. Most of the soldiers that
Stilico commanded were of barbarian origin. After Stilico was wrongfully executed in
408 AD, the family members of his barbarian foederati soldiers throughout Italy were
murdered by local Romans, and consequently at least 30,000 of Stilico’s barbarian
soldiers mutinied and defected to the side of the rebelling Visigoth tribal leader Alaric.47
Deprived of the protection by its foederati soldiers, the city of Rome was unable to
defend itself, and it fell to the sack of Visigoth invaders in 410 AD. The countdown to
the last days of the Western Roman Empire had begun.
Similar events also occurred in China in the late second century, when the
“barbarization” of the Chinese empire’s military force proceeded to a new height and
was exemplified in the career of the warlord Dong Zhuo (董卓). As a general of the
empire, he spent several decades on its western frontier regions, where he recruited tens
of thousands of soldiers from the Qiang barbarian tribes and cultivated close
relationships with them. On grounds of such rapprochement, he declined the central
government’s attempt to dispatch him to commanding posts in other regions.
After civil war broke out in the empire’s heartland, Dong Zhuo launched his barbarian
soldiers to invade its capital regions and committed rampant ransacking and pillaging.
Cai Wenji (蔡文姬), a contemporary female poet who lived in the Chinese capital,
witnessed and personally suffered from such ransacking, later wrote the following lines:
To the eastern territory Dong Zhuo’s soldiers are marching down,
with metal armors glittering in the sunshine.
Fragile are the folks living on flat plains,
whilst all invading soldiers are barbarians.
Ransacking the countryside and sieging the towns,
They are destroying and killing wherever they advance...48
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If the barbarized troops commanded by Dong Zhuo could be deemed a tool for the
barbarian tribes’ invasion into Sinic heartland, then the vandalization committed by his
army in the Chinese empire’s capital regions in 190 – 191 AD was comparable to the
barbarian sack of the city of Rome in the fifth century. When we extrapolate the above
barbarian invasions that were going on in China, we could even infer that the Chinese
empire would soon experience the same type of barbarian conquest that the Western
Roman Empire experienced in the fifth century. It was largely thanks to the efforts of
various Chinese princes that rose to power around 200 AD that the country was saved
from the fate of imminent conquest. Just as the Roman Tetrarchy performed fairly well
in protecting the Roman border against barbarian invasions, when the Chinese princes
established the Three Kingdoms of Wei (魏), Shu (蜀) and Wu (吴) that succeeded the
Han Empire, they each took a series of military and political measures aiming at
pacifying the barbarian tribes that were previously encroaching upon the territories of
the Chinese empire. Unlike the inertia and ineptitude shown by the late Han Empire in
dealing with border crises, a much higher level of vigor seemed to be released in each
of the three kingdoms in tactically handling the challenges posed by the internal and
external barbarians.
For example, after defeating Hun forces in major battles, Cao Cao (曹操), founder of
the kingdom of Wei, induced numerous Hunnish tribesmen to migrate into Chinese
territory proper, put them under the supervision of Chinese governors but largely
retained the autonomy of Hunnish tribes. He also recruited numerous soldiers from the
barbarian tribes of Wuhuan and used them for defending his kingdom’s northeastern
territory against potential invaders from further north.
It was through a combination of peculiar geopolitical situations and political capabilities
that the Chinese empire escaped the fate of barbarian conquest in the early third century
and obtained a limited lease of life.
However, it was unable to solve the inherent structural issues that nearly overwhelmed
the late East Han Empire: dwindling military effectiveness of the central government,
sub-standard qualities of military recruits, combined with large waves of barbarians
migrating into the empire’s borders, eager to join the Chinese army or seeking other
opportunities. When the same crises emerged again in the early fourth century due to
a new wave of barbarian invasion, the rulers of the Jin dynasty would not be as lucky
as its predecessors. Soldiers of barbarian origins who served in the imperial army were
widely involved in the civil war fought among the eight contending princes in the early
fourth century, and in this process they increased their political influence in northern
China. Led by a tribal leader named Liu Yuan who previously served as an officer of
the imperial army but subsequently mutinied, Hun barbarians marched into the capital
city of Jin in 317 AD and ended its rule in north China. This scene would be a rehearsal
of what would unfold in the Western Roman Empire in the next century.
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In both empires, when the key sources for recruiting soldiers had moved from the
empire’s “internal” barbarians to the “external” barbarians who had recently migrated
into the empire’s peripheral regions and had barely assimilated into the empire’s
mainstream cultural traditions, the life of the aging empire entered its final stage.
Part II: Case Studies in Indigenous Tribesmen’s Military Service Obligations in
Early China and Rome
II. A: Two Tribes Exempted from Military Services
As we can see above, both Rome at stages R(1) - R(3) and early Sinic states at stages
C(1) - C(4) relied on their own citizens and subjects as principal sources for recruiting
soldiers. Soldiers of the early Roman Republic were recruited from Roman citizens
who had met certain property requirements and from allied polities (socii) in Italy that
had treaty-based obligations to send troops to fight together with Rome. The key
obligation of the subjects in the newly-conquered provinces was to pay requisite types
of taxes or tributes.
At comparable stages in China were indigenous tribes which under the control of an
early Sinic polity were often given legal exemption from military services.
The discussion in this section will focus on the military service obligations of two
indigenous tribes who resided near the Three Gorges region in the middle range of the
Yangtze River Valley.
Although this region is located not far from the Sinic heartland of the Central Plains,
during the early Sinic dynasties it was home to various barbarian ethnic groups which
had kept distinct cultural traits of their own and maintained their own tribal
organizations. For example, for many centuries an ancient polity called Ba (巴) resided
in the mountainous regions to both sides of the Three Gorges. After the Ba people were
conquered in 316 BC, the victorious ruler of the state of Qin kept intact the pre-existing
tribal organization of this region; one branch of the Ba people migrated several hundred
miles east to Hubei province, and one branch migrated west to Jialing (嘉陵江) Valley
and was called Banshun Barbarians (板楯蛮) or Cong (賨) people.
During the Warring States period, although the territory of Banshun tribesmen was put
under the control of the Qin kingdom, which was engaged in continuous warfare, Qin
rulers did not impose any military service obligations on the members of this tribe.
According to ancient historical records, in the early third century BC, in the vast
mountainous regions near the homeland of Banshun tribes, a white tiger was reputed to
be dangerous and killed or wounded a huge number of humans.
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The king of Qin made a public offer that anyone who could kill the tiger would be
rewarded with an extremely valuable grant of vassal subjects and money. In response
to the offer, a brave man of the Banshun tribe shot dead the white tiger with a strong
bow.
However, the initial promise of reward posted by the king was intended for rewarding
a regular Qin subject within the Qin’s household registration system and did not
contemplate the possibility that the winner would be a tribesman. In order to deliver
some reward at all, the king entered with the Banshun tribes into a treaty stipulating,
among others: (i) any land owned by Banshun tribesmen should be exempted from tax
or tribute, and (ii) a Banshun household should be free from any tax-related
governmental survey regardless of however big its size was. The treaty was observed
by both parties throughout the period thereafter when the region was ruled by the Qin
regime.49
The treaty did not make any requirement on the tribesmen’s obligation for military
service and essentially granted them exemption in this respect. As the Qin regime
conscripted soldiers from those subjects that were registered in its 20-level official
ranking system, it did not enlist Banshun tribesmen who were outside this system.
After the founding of the Han Empire, the new government exempted Banshun’s seven
clans from military service obligations, and each household of Banshun commoners
was required to only pay 40 cashes of “cong” (賨) tribute in respect of each subject each
year.50 This was a quite light burden, given that during most of Han Dynasty, each
normal adult subject was required to pay a poll tax of 120 cashes each year.
A similar example was the Ba Barbarians whose homeland was close to Banshun tribes.
After conquering the Ba region in 316 BC, the kingdom of Qin retained the pre-existing
tribal organizations of Ba Barbarians and set forth preferential policies under which (i)
each of their tribal chieftains should pay to the Qin state a tribute of 2,016 cashes each
year and an extra tribute of 1,800 cashes every 3 years; and (ii) each common tribesman
should each year contribute to the Qin state cloth of about 19 meters long and 30
feathered arrows. 51 In return, each Ba tribesman would receive the official ranking of
“bugeng” (不更), which was a rather generous grant, given that “bugeng” was the fourth
rank from the bottom in Qin’s ranking system and that a normal Qin subject (under the
household registration system) had to make substantial military achievements at war in
order to win this ranking. What was more important, the grant of this title would exempt
Ba tribesmen from the obligation of serving in the Qin’s military forces.
49
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After the founding of the Han Empire, at the request of the local governor, the above
pre-existing exemption was officially retained by the new government.52 Therefore, the
death penalty imposed a few years later upon an adult male of another tribe in the same
region seemed to be rather controversial.
II. B: Death Penalty Case Relating to Conscription of a Tribesman
The appellate cases that were recorded in bamboo slips and excavated in Zhangjiashan
(张家山) in 1983 provided a good snapshot of the judicial cases being handled by the
central government of Han Empire during its very first years. 53 Among them, the
following case raised the issue of military service obligation for tribesmen outside the
empire’s household registration system.
In 196 BC, a defendant named Wuyou (毋忧) was arrested and indicted by the local
government on the following grounds: he was conscripted by the local government for
military service at a certain military camp, for which an official order had been issued,
but Wuyou deserted on route and escaped before he arrived at the destination camp to
which he had been dispatched. Wuyou defended himself on the legal ground that as he
was an adult male of a barbarian tribe, he should be exempted from military service
obligation after paying a tribute of 56 cashes to the local government each year, and
therefore there was no ground for him to be conscripted.
The magistrate hearing this case stated to the defendant:
“The law stipulates that barbarian adult men can be exempted from corvee-based
military services and tax obligations after paying certain amount of tribute
money every year. But it does not state that they are exempted from garrisonbased military services. Even if the law does stipulate that they are exempted
from garrison-based military service after paying the tribute, you became a
soldier anyway after you were conscripted. What is your explanation for your
absconding without authorization?”54
The defendant replied to the magistrate:
"I belong to a barbarian tribe whose members, after paying a special category of
tribute in lieu of services each year, are exempted from corvee, taxes and military
services. Please consider this and I can explain no more.”55
52
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There were different opinions among the local magistrates who heard the case. Some
opined that the defendant was guilty and should be executed, while others opined that
he was innocent. Therefore, this case was submitted to the Court Commandant of the
imperial central government to seek final judgment. The final judgment issued by the
Court Commandant was that the defendant was guilty and shall be executed.56
There was an element of surprise in the final judgment issued by the central
government, given that the local magistrate did acknowledge that according to the Han
Empire’s Law on Barbarians, after paying a special type of tribute (which was only a
fraction of the prevalent tax burden for regular subjects of the empire), barbarian adult
men could be exempted from taxes and corvee-based military services (i.e.徭). At the
level of legal technique, it was difficult for us to give a conclusive opinion on whether
the final judgment was totally fair for the defendant, since we do not have on hand the
texts of the effective laws or statutes that governed this case, said the court. It was
possible that one factor might have contributed to the Commandant of Court’s decision:
the above-mentioned law might have only exempted barbarian tribesmen from corveebased military services (i.e.徭), without exempting them from garrison-based military
services (屯), and the unlucky defendant did not have enough legal knowledge to
distinguish the niceties of these concepts and their applications.
Meanwhile, in examining this case we need to take into consideration a deep
undercurrent that foreboded a shift in the Chinese empire’s policy in the direction of
conscription/recruitment of tribal members into the imperial army.
After its re-unification of the country, while the Han Empire was in need of high-quality
military recruits, it had to consider a new set of social factors that were unfavorable for
recruiting soldiers from regular domestic subjects under the household registration
system. In this newly established empire, a huge number of domestic subjects had been
exempted from military services. According to the rules set forth by the first emperor
Liu Bang, numerous categories of individual subjects did not have to serve military
duties.57
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These categories include, among others:
- the dozens of thousands of soldiers who had followed emperor Liu Bang in his battle against the
Huns in the winter of 200 BC;
- grassroots bureaucrats in charge of moral education;
- subjects who had received official honors for filial piety or diligent farming;
- disciples of officially-appointed Confucian scholars, and experts in Confucian classics; and
- subjects whose body height did not reach the minimum requisite for military service
See Guo Jian (郭建), Jin Ge Tie Ma (金戈铁马) (Changchun Publishing House, 2008), at 10 – 11.
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All family members of certain categories were exempted from military service duties
as well.58
Due to such a broad scope of exemptions, a substantial portion of the empire’s
population (together with their family members) did not have to perform military
services. As each of the above-listed categories covered a huge number of subjects, the
total number of the subjects required to perform military services was hugely curtailed,
and military duties were expected to be shouldered primarily by peasants of middling
or lower social status who were inside the empire’s household registration system.
However, unlike the preceding Warring States and civil war periods when military feats
provided numerous soldiers of humble origins with opportunities for generous rewards
and for quick elevation in political status, such shortcuts to social mobility hardly
existed in the new empire which had largely pacified its domestic territories. In a
changed society where social mobility could be realized from other channels (e.g.
expertise in Confucian classics, or training as governmental clerks), military service no
longer looked like a highly attractive career, as it once had, for aspiring men within the
household registration system. It would be desirable for the empire to find new
alternative sources for military recruitment, and enlisting soldiers from tribesmen
outside the household registration system emerged as a logical choice.
The big-picture background to this death penalty case was that the Chinese empire had
just started to feel the need for recruiting soldiers from barbarian tribes to meet its
military needs.
58

These categories include, among others:
-

Relatives of the royal family;
offspring of high-ranking officials who had played crucial roles in establishing the Han empire;
officers who were above the 9th rank from the bottom in the empire’s 20-level ranking system;
subjects of the home towns of the empire’s founding emperor;
prefectural governor-level officials who had loyally followed Liu Bang to central Sichuan region
in 206 BC;
households which herded horses for the government;
households which were ordered to migrate from the Sinic heartland to settle in the frontier
regions;
descendants of subjects who were above 90 years of age;
subjects who had donated horses, chariots, slaves or substantial amounts of grain to the
government;
subjects who had purchased senior official ranking status from the government;
subjects which were in the customary mourning period after bereavement of senior family
members.

For policy statements relating to some of the above exemptions, see Ban Gu (班固), Hanshu, Gaodi
Annals, Vol. 1 (《汉书•高帝纪第一下》), Zhonghua Publishing House(中华书局) 2000, at 40. See
also Guo Jian (郭建), Jin Ge Tie Ma (金戈铁马) (Changchun Publishing House, 2008), at 11.
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After Rome entered its stage R(4) and the Sinic state entered its stage C(5), each empire
often enlisted soldiers from its provincial and tribal regions. The military systems of
both empires each underwent a transition into a professional standing army, and both
empires regarded tribal members as good materials for military professionals while the
mainstream members of both empires had lost their previous zeal for military services.
It was under the above new social circumstances that the senior judicial officials
deliberated upon this defendant’s case, and they came up with a final judgment that
would not have been made in the previous era. This was an early sign of a looming
future trend for recruiting soldiers from tribal entities, and such trend gradually gained
momentum during the following decades. Unfortunately, the defendant in this case had
only had a narrow literal understanding of the pre-existing legal rule and was unable to
foresee a subtle policy shift to which he would fall victim.
The logic that drove the judicial judgment in Wuyou’s case reasserted itself in the
drastic shift in military recruitment policy that would unfold in the mid- and late 2nd
century BC.
As the Chinese empire’s war efforts against the Huns intensified, more and more
common subjects secured exemptions from military services by either paying special
tributes or purchasing official rankings higher than the 9th rank, and increasingly fewer
subjects were available for military drafts.59 With the deterioration in the enforcement
of the universal conscription system, an acute question arose: from where should the
empire recruit numerous high-quality soldiers for its external wars? The answer was
provided in a memorial submitted by Chao Cuo (晁错), a senior policy adviser in the
imperial central government, to emperor Wendi (reigning during 180 BC – 157 BC):
Barbarians such as Yiqu (义渠) people have now defected to our empire to become
naturalized, and their tribes amount to thousands of people. Their diet and skills
were the same as those of the Huns. It will be desirable to grant to them hard
armor, padded clothes, strong bows and sharp arrows, together with good horses
from our frontier prefectures. Through Your Majesty’s clear rules, they will be
commanded by wise generals who know their customs and build rapport with their
minds. Situations of dangers and barriers will be handled by these barbarians, and
situations on passages on flat plains will be handled by our [… domesticallyrecruited troops].

59

Ban Gu (班固), Hanshu, Vol. 24, Shi Huo Zhi (《汉书卷二十四下•食货志第四下》), Zhonghua

Publishing House(中华书局) 2000, at 972.
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These two armies will cooperate on external and internal sides, each will apply
their own superior skills and will impose their forces collectively in a balanced
manner, which will make an ideal strategy.60

Judging from the defense policies that the Chinese empire pursued afterwards, we find
that Chao Cuo’s advice was adopted and implemented on a massive scale during the
following centuries. The adoption of such policy resulted from the working of multiple
factors, including: (i) the empire’s acute need for high-quality soldiers in face of
growing menace from nomadic invaders from the steppes, (ii) military actions against
such nomadic invaders required a new set of skills that often were not possessed by
sedentary peasants who lived in the Chinese heartland under the household registration
system, (iii) the Han Empire did not have much incentive to nurture and promote a
militaristic culture among its own domestic subjects, (iv) military services ceased to be
a highly attractive avenue for social mobility for commoners, and (v) it would be more
cost-efficient for the imperial government to enlist tribesman shock troops than to
maintain and pay for a large standing army recruited from domestic peasants.
These factors would continue to be at work in the classical Chinese empire until the end
of its era in the early fourth century.
II. C: Tribal Insurgences Arising From Military Service Obligations at Stage C(6)
From stage R(5) onwards, the Roman Empire recruited into its supporting troops
(auxilia) large numbers of non-citizen subjects (peregrini) who lived in its outer
provinces.
Similarly, at stage C(6), the East Han Empire relied heavily upon the fighting power of
barbarian or tribal soldiers in putting down domestic rebellions and defending against
external invasion. The experience of Banshun tribe was a good case in point.
With the founding of the Eastern Han Dynasty in 25 AD came the final abolition of the
universal conscription system, the full establishment of a professional standing army,
and increasing use of military recruits from tribal entities. It naturally followed that at
this stage there arose a major demand for soldiers recruited from the Banshun tribesmen,
who had gained good reputation as valiant warriors. The superior military qualities of
Banshun soldiers were tested and acknowledged in a series of minor wars that broke
out between the Han regime and its external invaders:
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Ban Gu (班固), Hanshu, Vol. 49, Biography of Chao Cuo (《汉书卷四十九•晁错传》), Zhonghua
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•

During the years 107 –113 AD, Qiang barbarian tribes invaded deep into the
Han River Valley in central China and pillaged numerous cities. Han troops
recruited from Banshun tribes defeated them and annihilated most of the
invaders, who felt so awed with Banshun soldiers’ military power and started to
call them “divine soldiers”. Due to their fear of the Banshun’s warring power,
the defeated Qiang tribes warned their fellow tribesmen not to invade southward
again in the direction of Banshun regions.61

•

In 148 BC, when some Qiang tribes launched another major invasion of Han
territories, it was the troops recruited from Banshun barbarians who defeated
invaders in a series of battles and protected the Han Empire again.62

•

In 164 AD, when the barbarians living in Wuling (武陵) Prefecture to the south
launched a rebellion, the task of suppressing the rebellion was delegated by the
imperial government to General Feng Gun (冯绲), who grew up in the region
neighboring Banshun barbarians.
General Feng enlisted from his home region many Banshun soldiers, who,
together with the elite troops recruited from another group of barbarians from
southeastern China, played instrumental roles in defeating the rebels.63

However, in 179 AD, the Banshun tribes themselves began to rebel against Han
government. After Han troops fought the Banshun rebels for several years to no avail,
the emperor solicited opinions from a wide range of officials on how to tackle this
rebellion. Cheng Bao (程包), a local official whose jurisdiction was near the Banshun
homeland, submitted to the emperor a memorandum stating, inter alia:
Although Banshun tribesmen used to be effectively loyal and had no intention to
rebel, the magistrates and petty officials governing their counties and villages
levied on them excessive tributes in lieu of corvee and military services. The
compulsory burdens imposed upon them have been worse than those for serfs, and
the floggings they received were heavier than those for prisoners of war.
Consequently, some barbarians had to sell away their wives and children, and
some even committed suicide. Although they complained to the prefectural
officials about their grievances, the prefectural magistrates refused to accept or
hear their cases. The emperor was so too far away to hear their complaints. They
beat their bosoms in distant valleys with grudge, calling out for Providence. They
are saddened by corvee levies and harassed by harsh punishments.
See supra note 49, at 1920.
Ibid.
63
Ibid.
61
62
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Therefore, these barbarians gathered in their towns and villages, resulting in a
rebellion. Those who have masterminded the event neither harbor sophisticated
stratagem nor try to pretend to the throne of the emperor. Now as long as wise
governors are dispatched to their region, they will naturally stabilize and there will
be no need to send troops to attack them.64

Following Cheng Bao’s counsel, the emperor sent an emissary who announced a
declaration of pardon to all the Banshun tribal rebels, and the rebellion quickly
subsided.
Heavy use of tribal or barbarian soldiers proved to be a double-edge sword: it could
effectively meet a classical empire’s military needs but could also stir up domestic
insurgences. Such insurrections could pose serious security threats to the empire
because these tribal entities, as vital sources of military recruits, had already possessed
military skills that could be as good as other units of the empire’s military forces.
However, such clashes with the tribal entities were difficult to avoid, when an empire’s
administrative machine took on signs of ineptitude at its declining stage and failed to
notice that the tribal entities should be treated in different manners from the purely
domestic regions.
Generally speaking, the tribal entities tended to be more sensitive in maintaining their
communal pride and were at least one step slower than an empire’s domestic subjects
in acquiescing to the more centralized governance methods used by a classical empire.
Due to backgrounds that were comparable to the causes for the Banshun uprising, a
number of barbarian rebellions arose in the Roman Empire. For example, Bellum
Batonianum or the Pannonian Revolt took place in 6 – 9 AD in the western Balkans,
and it was caused by Rome’s excessive levy of taxes and forced draft of soldiers for its
war efforts in Germania. The tribal leader of this revolt claimed that the revolt was
caused by the Roman rulers: they were wolves who ravaged their subject peoples, not
shepherds who cared for them.65 A more fundamental reason for this revolt was that by
this stage many Italians had lost zeal in military service and Rome had no choice but to
resort to forced levies of soldiers from its newly-acquired provincial territories.
Another comparable incident was the Batavian Revolt that took place during 69 – 70
AD in the Roman province of Germania Inferior (in today’s southern Netherlands).
Batavians of this period were reputed to be good horsemen, boatmen and swimmers and
were heavily recruited into Roman auxiliary troops in return for the tribe’s exemption
from Roman tax otherwise applicable to peregrini.
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Ibid, at 1920 – 1921.
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With a population of only 35,000, normally about 5,000 Batavians were in active
service in the Roman army during this period, which means Batavians bore a very
disproportionately heavy burden of military service on a per capita basis. The triggering
points of this revolt were the harsh treatment that the Batavian commander Gaius Julius
Civilis received from the Roman judicial system and the chaotic situation of the Roman
civil war at the end of the Julio-Claudian Dynasty. Its real cause was very similar to
that of the Pannonian Revolt, according to Tacitus:
The young Batavians were being conscripted, which was a heavy enough burden
on its own, but it was exacerbated by the greed and depravity of the recruiting
officers, who called up the old and unfit in order to exact a bribe for their release,
while young, good-looking lads – for children are normally quite tall among the
Batavians - were dragged off [to gratify the lust of the recruiting officers]. This
caused bitter resentment, and the ringleaders of the revolt assembled and got their
countrymen to refuse service. 66
Despite the initial progress made in the uprising, the Batavian Revolt was eventually
suppressed, as a result of which the Batavian were still required to send recruits to eight
auxiliary units of Rome. This Roman decision after the revolt showed that by this time
it had become impossible for the empire to get away from its heavy dependence upon
military recruits from the non-citizens (peregrini).
The situation was quite similar to the Eastern Han Empire, which, despite the revolts
by the barbarian tribes against the heavy levies of the imperial government, stuck with
a vengeance to its dependence on the barbarian tribes as a vital source of military
recruits, until one such source of recruits – Qiang tribesmen on the western frontier –
disastrously ransacked the Chinese capital regions under the command of
Generalissimo Dong Zhuo.
Part III: Commonality of Convergent Evolution in Policies for Recruiting
Barbarian Soldiers
We need to seriously consider the histories of ancient empires from the perspective of
evolutionary theory, not as a metaphor for progressive social metamorphosis, but as a
pertinent methodology for describing the diversity of social phenomena resulting from
a series of unpredictable, highly diverse, many-branched pathways of change and
developments. 67 Putting on evolutionary spectacles could open us to brand-new
perspectives when examining ancient societal changes that unfolded in different
continents over very long time spans.

66
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Tacitus, The Histories, 4.14; trans. Kenneth Wellesley (Penguin Books Ltd, 2009), at 188.
The Dynamics of Ancient Empires (Oxford University Press, 2009), at 26.
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In particular, the similar evolutions in ancient Chinese and Roman military recruitment
systems (including their gradual shifts towards recruitment of non-subject barbarians)
bore resemblance to the biological phenomenon of “convergent evolution”, i.e.
mutually-independent development of similar features or functions by species from
different lineages (often in different geographical regions).68
Convergent phenomena in societal evolution tend to display themselves on an abstract
level and can be more easily discernible when the observer steps back to make a wider
observation of the totality of the evolving patterns. A Roman-style pathway in military
recruitment was trodden more than once in ancient history. Through the facts as
described in this paper, we can discover parallel evolution in Roman and early Chinese
empires regarding the relationship between each state and its military recruitment
system. In the life-cycle of each empire:
•
•
•
•
•

A citizen/aristocratic militia helped to establish its paternal predecessor state
A broadly-recruited mass army acted as the mid-wife at its birth
A professional standing army helped to expand its youthful stature to its most
robust shape
Troops recruited from domestic barbarian tribes served as health-improving
supplements for its middle age
Troops recruited from external barbarian tribes served first as its life-sustaining
medicine on deathbed, and then as its gravedigger.

After examining the above overall patterns of evolution, we could discover two other
common features in the two empires: (i) over many centuries, the standing of the
military recruits gradually changed from the society’s politically-franchised classes to
its politically-disfranchised domestic subjects, and then onto its politically-remote
frontier subjects; and (ii) the geographical origins of the military recruits gradually
changed from the national’s central regions to its external peripherals.
Such convergent evolutions were rooted in similar social forces at work in both empires.
At each turning point in the above evolutionary path, the policy makers of both empires
seemed to be acting on a rational basis when they revised the empire’s pre-existing
military recruitment policy. For example, in each empire, the recruiting of massive
amounts of barbarian soldiers was prompted by the following similar changes in its
social circumstances:

For the basic paradigm of convergent evolution, see George McGhee, Convergent Evolution: Limited
Forms Most Beautiful, at 2 - 3 (the MIT Press, 2011).
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(1) As each empire’s frontiers expanded, its soldiers had to endure greater hardships
on their expeditions (caused by more hostile natural environment of the
locations of services and greater distances between the battlegrounds and the
homelands), and were faced with increasingly less opportunities for winning
booty and/or materialistic privileges from military services.
(2) As external conquest/annexation of territories became less important in imperial
politics, a military career no longer provided the empire’s normal subjects with
an attractive route for social advancement.
(3) At the superstructure level, it became more and more cost-inefficient to maintain
hundreds of thousands of domestically-recruited soldiers who demanded regular
pay and provisions and whose services constituted major disruptions to the
empire’s labor-intensive agriculture-based economy.
(4) Troops recruited from barbarian tribesmen tended to possess superior military
skills, and the maintenance of such troops put smaller fiscal strain on the
empire’s dwindling treasury.
In hindsight, we notice that after the territorial size of a colossal classical empire
reached a critical stage, a negative feedback loop would emerge between its territorial
expansion and its domestic recruitment of soldiers, and wide use of tribal and barbarian
soldiers would be adopted as a logical and convenient solution to break such a negative
feedback loop. While such policy of massive recruitment of barbarian tribal members
into the imperial military systems served short-term interests well, in the long run it
would unconsciously help to dig the graves of the two senile empires on both ends of
the Eurasian continent.
Apart from the phenomenon that the patterns of the evolutionary trends in military
recruitment policies of both empires were very similar to each other, the timing of the
comparable evolutionary patterns in both empires should be examined.
Although the military recruitment system largely evolved in the two empires along the
same trajectory and at roughly the same speed, there consistently existed a time lag
between their comparable military recruitment practices, and the Chinese evolutionary
phases seemed to precede the counterpart’s evolutions in Rome by a period of two to
three centuries. For example, the recruitment of standing armies started in China in the
late fifth century BC, and the same development began in Rome near the end of the
second century BC (i.e. the Marian reforms). Barbarian tribal soldiers became the
backbone of the imperial military system in China by the late first century AD, and the
same development took place in Rome in the fourth century AD. Barbarian soldiers
ransacked the capital regions of the Chinese empire at the end of the second century
and again in the early fourth century AD, and the same incidents occurred to the city of
Rome in the fifth century AD.
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Conclusion
Generally speaking, these two classical empires of Rome and early China, situated on
the two ends of the Eurasian continent, having populations of similar numbers and
occupying land areas of similar sizes, seemed to evolve in similar directions in various
institutional aspects over many centuries. The military recruitment policies (including
its application to barbarian or tribal soldiers) can be regarded as a typical example of
the two empires’ convergent evolution in numerous institutional aspects.
Despite differences between their institutions at the technical level, striking similarities
in their evolutionary trajectories existed at many junctures. There existed an element
of symmetry between the evolutionary paths of these two empires. Why such a
symmetrical pattern existed at all in the evolutions of the institutions of ancient Roman
and Chinese empires could be studied in future research.
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